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Abstract
Calls for tenders are the natural devices to inform bidders, thus to
enlarge the pool of potential participants. We exploit discontinuities
generated by the Italian Law on tender’s publicity to identify the
effect of enlarging the pool of potential participants on competition
in public procurement auctions. We show that most of the effects
of publicity are at regional and European level. Increasing tenders’
publicity from local to regional determines an increase in the number
of bidders by 50% and an extra reduction of 5% in the price paid by the
contracting authority; increasing publicity from national to European
has no effect on the number of bidders but it determines an extra
reduction of 10% in the price paid by the contracting authority. No
effect is observed when publicity is increased from regional to national.
Finally, we relate measures of competition to ex-post duration of the
works finding a negative correlation between duration and the number
of bidders or the winning rebate.
JEL-Code: D02, D44, C31, L11.
Keywords: Public Procurement Auctions, Publicity, Regression Dis-
continuity, Duration Analysis.
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1 Introduction
Public procurement contracts in Member States amount to a huge slice of
the European Union’s GDP: 16 % in 2002. Only 16.2 % of the Union’s
public procurement is published in the European Official Journal, though.1
Member States and the European Commission are pushing to increase the
use of advertising policies by the contracting authorities considering it as the
natural device to improve the performance of public procurement markets.
For instance, Directive 2004/18/CE stresses the importance of an extensive
use of advertising in order to foster the participation of European firms in
tenders taking place within the European Market. Surprisingly, however, no
consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature exists on the effects of
increasing the pool of potential participants on the outcome of public pro-
curement auctions.
In this paper we use regression discontinuity methods (Angrist and Lavy,
1999; Hahn,Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001) to test for the effects of enlarg-
ing the pool of potential participants (i.e. of advertising a tender) on the
level and nature of competition in public procurement auctions in Italy. Fur-
thermore, we report evidence of the benefits of competition for the ex-post
duration of the works.
Assessing the benefits of publicity in public procurement auctions requires
going through the following steps: first, one should ask whether, and to what
extent, advertising influences competition; second, one should ask how com-
petition, as it is influenced by advertising policy, affects the price paid by
the auctioneer to the winning bidder, i.e. it determines the auctioneer’s rent.
As for the first point, notice that a firm can join an auction only if the firm
1European Commission, 2004.
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knows that the auction exists. Since participating in an auction requires sus-
taining some fixed cost, however, a firm might decide not to participate if it
thinks that competition will be too harsh.2 As for the second point, it is well
accepted that an increase in the number of participants increases the auction-
eer’s rent: firms are pushed to bid more aggressively if the number of bids is
increased.3 Beyond that, advertising can affect participants’ characteristics,
by stimulating entry of outsiders (i.e. those firms which are located outside
the region where the auction is taking place). Outsiders might decrease the
likelihood of collusion, since local firms find it more difficult to coordinate,
having fewer contacts with competitors.4 Outsiders can even have a different
cost structure: firms located far from the auctioneer participate only if their
costs to operate at distance are very low. On the other hand, wide publicity
may discourage entry of local firms since, ceteris paribus, the incentive to
participate is lower when more firms are applying. Local firms may have a
deeper knowledge of the procedure implemented and of the work’s features
and they can exploit scale economies by dealing with the same authority
more than once. It turns out that if local firms are driven out of the market,
there can be an efficiency loss. It is not clear, then, what is the magnitude
2Indeed, suppose you are an entrepreneur and that yours is one of the few companies
which know that the tender is taking place. When deciding whether to participate or not
in the auction, you will take into account that the number of competitors that you will
face is small and that the likelihood of submitting a winning bid is high. As a result, your
incentives to join the auction are likely to be very high. Now, suppose that one day you
open your favorite national newspaper and realize that another contracting authority is
advertising a similar tender. If the agency did not advertise the tender, surely you would
not have participated: you actually would not have any clue that tender was taking place.
However, your incentives to participate are now smaller: since the tender is advertised
on a national newspaper, you expect competition to be harsh. You might then decide
not to participate because your expected profits (which are a function of the probability
of submitting a winning bid) are not enough to offset your participation costs. In other
words, increasing the number of potential participants has an ambiguous effect on auction’s
outcome.
3See, for example, Brannman et al. (1987) and Klemperer (2002).
4See Compte et al. (2005).
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of the effect on auctioneers’ rent which is associated to publicity and its se-
lective effect rather than to its direct effect, on the number of participants.
Figure (1) offers a graphical representation of these simple concepts.
To analyze this issue, we introduce a simple model of first price sealed
bid auctions with participation costs where the number of bidders is en-
dogenously determined. Under certain assumptions (namely: that publicity
reduces firms’ searching costs), we show that the optimal level of public-
ity can be below its maximum possible level, independently of its cost. It
turns out that a rule forcing contracting authorities to a certain publicity
level may reduce the revenues of the auctioneer and thus reduce welfare, in
a context of public procurement auctions. Next, we empirically test the ef-
fect of publicity on competition exploiting the discontinuities generated by
the Italian law on public procurement which imposes different levels of pub-
licity according to the auction’s starting value. Italian law prescribes that
every public procurement auction should be advertised at 1 of the 4 differ-
ent available publicity levels (Local, Regional, National, European) on the
basis of their starting value.5 Our empirical analysis is based on a unique
administrative data set from the Italian Authority for Surveillance of Pub-
lic Procurement (“Autorita’ per La Vigilanza sui Lavori Pubblici”, AVLP).
The Authority collects data on the universe of Italian public procurement
auctions, for tenders starting value greater or equal to e 150,000 (we had
access to the data referring to the period 2000-2005). A Regression Dis-
continuity Design (RDD), a quasi-experimental setting, can then be used to
compare the outcomes of auctions with starting value immediately above or
below each discontinuity threshold. Auctions above and below the thresholds
5In particular see Law n. 109 del 11 February 1994, so called “Legge Merloni”; “Legge
quadro in materia di lavori pubblici”
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have different publicity levels, but should otherwise be identical in terms of
observable and unobservable characteristics determining the outcome of in-
terest, which in our case are: the number of bidders and the winning rebate.
Using this source of identification of the causal effect we show that increasing
tenders’ publicity from local to regional determines an average increase of 19
percentage points in the number of bidders with respect to a sample average
of 38, and an average increase in the winning rebate of 4.9 percentage points
with respect to a sample average of 16 %. A back of the envelope calculation
suggests that if all the auctions that by law are published at local level were
published at regional level then average revenues would have been increased
by e 25,000 for tenders with average starting value of e 516,000, provided
that the average cost of publishing at regional level is e 1,000. In contrast
to the regional effect, we observe no effect on the number of bidders and the
winning rebate when publicity is increased from regional to national level.6
Interestingly, on the other hand, we observe that an increase in publicity
from national to European level has no effect on the number of bidders but
it determines an increase in the winning rebate of 10 percentage points. This
suggests that selection of the bidders via advertisement plays a major role
when the auction has an European relevance.
Further, we analyze the relationship between competition in auctions and
the time to accomplish the works after the auction has taken place. It might
be, indeed, that a substantial increase in the number of participants en-
courages firms to over-bid inducing a non sustainable commitment for the
winner.7 Using duration analysis models, we report evidence of a negative
and statistically significant correlation between the time it takes for the win-
6As Table (5) shows, the effect on the number of bidders would be negative, if any, at
a 10% significance level
7This is the well known winner’s curse phenomenon
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ner to accomplish the tendered works and the number of participants or the
winning rebate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section (2) we describe the
related literature, in Section (3) we introduce the theoretical model, Section
(4) describes the institutional framework; Section (5) reports the empirical
analysis. Conclusions and policy implications are discussed in Section (7).
2 Related Literature
The literature looking at what fosters competition in public procurement auc-
tions is large. In this paper we mainly draw from the theoretical contributions
of Levin and Smith (1994) and Menezes and Monteiro (1996, 2000) and we
consider the link between publicity and competition in a stylized model of
endogenous entry to auctions where entry is costly and advertising tenders
decreases firms’ search costs. Both Levin and Smith (1994) and Menezes and
Monteiro (1996, 2000) consider a mechanism by which firms decide whether
or not to participate in an auction. They differ, though, in the timing dimen-
sion of their models: in Levin and Smith (1994) firms incur a fixed cost of
entry before seeing their values for the object while in Menezes and Monteiro
(1996, 2000) firms learn their values prior to incurring bid preparation costs.
Their conclusions are thus different: Levin and Smith (1994) suggest that
the seller should not limit entry through a restriction policy (e.g. an entry
fee) while Menezes and Monteiro (1996, 2000) find that entry fees may be
optimal for the seller since they help to screen low valuation bidders when
increased competition reduces the seller’s expected revenue. Our model fol-
lows the one used by Menezes and Monteiro (1996, 2000) and integrates it
with the possibility for the seller to advertise the tender.
From an empirical point of view, the effect of advertising tenders on com-
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petition has never been directly tested. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) use a
structural analysis to test the model of Levin and Smith (1994) with a dataset
of E-Bay coin auctions. They find that the expectation of one additional bid-
der decreases bids by 3.2% in a representative auction. In addition, they find
that the value of the object is among the main determinants of entry. They
do not consider advertising, though. Lundberg (2005) investigates the choice
of procurement procedure in public auctions in Sweden where the contracting
entity may choose one among several available mechanisms which are linked
with different restrictions on entry. Indeed, since publicity is a tool used to
favor entry, the choice of advertising an auction may be seen as the choice of
relaxing entry restrictions. Lundberg’s (descriptive) results do not show any
significant impact from contract specifications and municipality characteris-
tics on the probability that the contracting authority does not restrict entry.
Finally Leslie and Zoido (2007) study how markets can provide private incen-
tives to increase the provision of information in public procurement auctions.
They find evidence that the introduction of an ’information entrepreneur’,
i.e. an entrepreneur who collects and sells announcements about forthcoming
auctions, causes a 2.9 % decrease in the cost for drug procurement in public
hospitals in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Our paper aims at supplementing this literature with empirical results based
on (quasi-) experimental evidence.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we introduce a theoretical framework for the question tested
by our empirical analysis. The model described below is a tool which allows
to grasp the economic phenomenon underlying the issue tackled by this paper
i.e. the effect of an increase in tender’s advertisement level. The empirical
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analysis, though, is not supposed to test the predictions of the model. Indeed,
as described in the following section, the auctions included in our database
show some similarities with the traditional first price auction model but can-
not be properly considered as such, since they implement a complex model
of selection of the bids. While a specific model capable to capture this com-
plexity would go beyond the scope of this paper, the model described below
lets us achieve a main result, reported in proposition 1, which we believe to
hold also in the context of the data used in the empirical analysis.
Following Menezes and Monteiro (2000) - henceforth (MM) - we model
a public procurement auction as a first price sealed bid auction where the
number of bidders is endogenous. A single contract is put out to tender.
The auctioneer is assumed to have zero reserve price. Firms bid a rebate b
on the auction’s starting amount for which they would be willing to do the
works. Bidder i knows her own value vi of the contract and the distribution
F (vi),∀i 6= j of other n bidders’ values. F (.) is continuous with support
[0, v]. Participating to the auction requires sustaining a fixed cost c plus
some searching cost δ which for the moment are assumed to be 0.8 Each bid-
der decides whether to submit a bid before knowing how many competitors
will participate in the auction. Assuming that everyone else except i use the
same strategy b, we have that i’s expected profits are:
pii(vi,bi, b) = (vi − bi)(F (max
{
b−1(bi), vρ
}
))n−1 − c
where vρ solves vρF (vρ)
n−1− c and it is such that pii(vρ, b∗) = 0 i.e. vρ is the
cut-off value when all bidders use the same equilibrium strategy b∗.9 The
optimal bidding strategy which maximizes i’s expected profits is then given
8You may well think about c as the cost of preparing a project and submit a bid, while
δ is the cost of looking around for existing tenders.
9(MM) show that such strategy exists. Notice that for any c < 1, v′ρ(n) < 0.
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by:
b∗(v) =
{∫ vvρ (n−1)xF (x)n−2f(x)dx
F (v)n−1 , v ≥ vρ
0, v < vρ
(1)
Equation (1) is crucial. It tells us that increasing the number of potential
participants has two opposite effects on the optimal bidding strategy. On
the one hand, since the cut-off value vρ value is increasing in n (provided
that c < 1), it decreases the probability that a player i participates to the
auction (since that happens only if vi > vρ). On the other hand, it increases
the equilibrium bid, since participating players take into account that, in
equilibrium, other bidders participate only if their value is greater than vρ.
The expected revenue generated by the auction is then given by the high-
est bid among those submitted:
R =
∫ v
vρ
b∗(x)nF n−1(x)f(x)dx
MM then show that the revenue generated by a first price sealed bid auction
is equivalent to that generated by a second price sealed bid auction when
the number of potential players is fixed and participation is endogenous. It
turns out that R can be rewritten as follows:
R = n(n− 1)
∫ v
vρ
(1− F (x))x(F (x))n−2f(x)dx
Now suppose that the auctioneer is able to control the number of participants
in order to maximize her revenue. MM uses a variable δ ∈ (−c, 1− c) which
represents an entry fee (if positive) or a subsidy (if negative). In our context,
δ represents firms’ searching cost, which are assumed to be decreasing in the
level of publicity. Let us introduce a new continuous variable p ∈ [0, δ] which
is directly correlated with the auctioneer’s advertising effort. Let us assume
that a marginal increase in p is translated in an equivalent reduction in δ
at a cost
p2
2
λz, where z is the advertising cost (e.g. the cost of publishing
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the tender on a national newspaper) and λ is the shadow cost of public
expenditure.
Thus, total revenue can be maximized by:
ϕ(δ̂) = max
p
(
n(n− 1)
∫ v
vρ(δ−p)
(1− F (x))x(F (x))n−2f(x)dx− p
2
2
λz
)
which yields:
ϕ′(δ − p∗) = −n(n− 1)(1− F (vρ(δ − p∗)))vρ(δ − p∗)·
·(F (vρ(δ − p∗)))n−2f(vρ(δ − p∗))v′ρ(δ − p∗)− p∗λz = 0
(2)
which implicitly defines the optimal level of publicity p∗.
Equation (2) has a simple and powerful implication: the optimal level
of publicity may be lower than its maximum possible level even if its cost
is zero i.e. z = 0 ; p∗ = δ. In other words, it might be optimal for
the auctioneer not to increase the number of potential bidders in order to
increase its revenue, even if it did not spend anything to do so. The intuition
comes directly from equation (1). Indeed, to show that this is the case, it is
sufficient to find at least one case in which the optimal level of δ is positive
notwithstanding z = 0. The following example illustrates this possibility.10
Example 1 Assume that the n players are represented by random draws
from the distribution F (x) = x4 and p = z = 0. Expected revenue is then:
R = 4n(n− 1)
(
1− c− δ
4n− 3 −
1− (c+ δ) 4n−14n+3
4n+ 1
)
Assume further that n = 20 and c = 0.1. It turns out that the level of δ
which maximizes R is positive and it is δ = 0.031.
10Example 1 is similar to example 4 of MM.
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We can then state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Independently of its cost, the optimal level of publicity can
be below its maximum possible level.
Proof. It follows directly from example 1.
From a policy point of view Proposition (1) suggests that a rule prescrib-
ing a unique level of publicity, given the starting value of the auction can
be sub-optimal.11 In this paper we show that this can be the case once we
have considered tenders’ publicity at national level. Indeed, the empirical
analysis reported in section (5) shows that increasing publicity from regional
to national level has no effect on the winning rebate and no or negative effect
on the number of bidders.
We now proceed illustrating the data and the institutional framework.
4 Data and Institutional Framework
We base our empirical analysis on a unique administrative data set from the
Italian Authority for Surveillance of Public Procurement (“Autorita` per la
Vigilanza sui Lavori Pubblici”, AVLP), which collects data on the universe
of public procurement auctions in Italy for public works with starting value
greater or equal to 150,000 euros. For our analysis we refer to the data
collected between 2000 and 2005. The database includes information at auc-
tion level on the contracting authority (i.e. the auctioneer which is also the
buyer), the advertisement level, on the typology of the works which are put
out to tender, on bidding behavior and on the identity of the winning firms
11Notice that there might be other reasons why a uniform level of publicity could be
desirable, though. The most obvious one is that a case by case analysis for deciding which
is the optimal level of publicity would be very expensive and likely unfeasible.
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(i.e. the seller). Tables (1) and (2) report the descriptive statistics relative
to the sample. Our database amounts to 41510 auctions with direct par-
ticipation of firms (’Pubblico Incanto’ in the terminology used by the law).
The contracting authorities are mainly municipalities (52% of the sample).
The rest of the sample is made up of tenders invited by provinces (12%),
health-care public bodies (ASL) and other public bodies or corporations.12
The contracting authorities in the sample are mainly located in the North
of Italy, (45%), while 25 % are in the Center and 22 % are in the South
of Italy. Similar figures are reported in Table (2) once we consider the de-
scriptive statistics for the main typologies of auctions. Some differences in
the descriptive statistics of the typology “Road and Constructions” can be
observed, although no difference exist in the general provision of the law for
the different typologies analyzed.
The contracting authority must define all the details concerning the works
that have to be carried on by the winning firm, including the starting price
that the auctioneer would pay to the winner if only one firm participates to
the auction. On average, the auctions’ starting value in the sample amounts
to 720 thousands of euros, though the standard deviation is rather high.
Indeed, the median starting value is 360 thousands of euros. Notice, more-
over, that most of the auctions are done to contract out road’s constructions
(30.6% of the total) which include maintenance, reconstruction and whatever
is necessary to guarantee truckage, by rail and air transport. The contracting
authority must define the requirements which have to be satisfied by bidders
as well. Bidders have to be certified that they are able to carry on the works
of that particular size and in that particular sector i.e. they need to be au-
dited by an attestor society (SOA, societa` organismo di attestazione) and be
12We do not report those figures (they are available on request).
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registered for the required category in a specific book. So, for example, if the
construction of a road is put out to tender and the contracting authority esti-
mates that the amount of qualified work that has to be done is valued 700,000
euros, the required SOA category will likely be: 3-OG3, where 3 refers to the
size of the works and OG3 to the category “road constructions”. The size
requirements are mainly based on firms’ turnover.13 Table (1) reports that
13% of the auctions require the category Buildings e.g. OG1, while 29% of
the auctions a SOA category, e.g. size of the works of 3.
All the auctions considered in the following analysis are structured as first-
price sealed-bid auctions: firms bid the price for which they are willing to do
the works in the form of a percentage reduction - rebate - with respect to the
auction’s starting value. In all the considered auctions the selection criterion
for the winner is uniquely based on the rebate i.e. the technical component
of firms’ offer plays no role (provided that the winner will satisfy some mini-
mum quality standards which are set by the contracting authority). Notice,
however, that because of the institutional mechanism prescribed by the law,
the winning rebate is not necessarily the highest bidden: in order to prevent
firms from over-bidding (i.e. bidding a price which does not allow to recoup
works’ expenses) a complex (and criticizable) mechanism is implemented.
According to this rule, all bids which exceed the average bid by more than
the average deviation from the average are automatically excluded.14 It turns
13Notice that the required SOA category is not a direct function of the auction’s starting
value. Indeed, the works to be done are usually a complex combination of several expertises
and hence the required SOA categories may be more than once. For our analysis we
consider just the primary required SOA category. Moreover, by a careful study of the
Law 109/94 we exclude that both requirements change discontinuously at the publicity
thresholds.
14Bidders thus have to guess which will be these ’anomaly thresholds’, as they are called,
and try to place a bid within them. As for illustration, consider this simple example. In a
hypothetical auction there are three participants placing the following bids (rebates to the
auction’s starting value): 5, 6 and 19. The average bid is thus 10. The average difference
12
out that the auctions included in our database are not proper first price auc-
tions.
The first five rows of Table (1) report descriptive statistics of auctions’
outcomes. In the sample, it is observed that the average number of firms
participating to the auction is 32 (standard deviation is 35), and a median
of 21. The winning rebate is on average 16% (standard deviation is 8.9),
which is very close to the median value (15%). To further characterize the
nature of competition within auctions we consider three main indicators: the
probability of a winner coming from outside the region were the auction is
held, the legal nature of the winner, and the indication of whether the winner
is a member of a group of related firms. In the sample the probability that
the winner is coming from outside the region is 37 % while only 6.5% of the
winners are public companies and 18% of the winners are member of a group
of firms.
Concerning tenders’ advertisement, until July 2006, auctions were classified
by the law according to their starting value.15 Table (3) illustrates that
rule: the first column reports y, the auction’s starting value (in hundreds of
thousands euro), the second column reports the level of publicity required
by the law, the third and the fourth columns reports the correspondent cost
of advertising and the percentage of non-compliance to the prescribed rule,
respectively.
According to Table (3), auctions with starting value below 500 thousands of
from the average bid is 6. Thus the bottom and the upper anomaly thresholds are 4 and
16 respectively. It turns out that in this case the winning bid is 6 even if 19 is the highest
bidden rebate. Albano et al. (2006b) provide a summary of the properties of several
winning methods in public procurement auctions.
15From July 2006, Law 163/2006 removes the thresholds and forces the contracting
authorities to publish on GURI at a national newspaper level, regardless of the auction’s
starting value (if it is greater than 150, 000 euros). By focusing on data before 2006, this
paper provides insights to assess that reform.
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euros have to be published on the contracting authority’s notice board. This
is the least amount of possible publicity, since only firms which have direct
access to the auctioneer’s premises or have direct contact with its staff may
get information on the tender. The cost of publishing on the notice board
is zero. Not surprisingly, the degree of compliance is very high: 94% of the
auctions observe the prescribed rule. The second interval goes from 500 thou-
sands to one million and it identifies those auctions for which the compulsory
level of publicity is regional i.e. those tenders that must be advertised in at
least two newspapers spread all over the province where the works should
be made and in the official regional journal (Bollettino Ufficiale Regionale,
BUR). Publishing on BUR is very cheap: an average tender should not cost
more than 200-500 euros. Provincial newspapers are cheap as well, since ad-
vertisement’s price is proportional to the number of printed copies. However,
the degree of compliance is rather low: only 71% of the auctions satisfy the
publicity requirements. The third level of publicity is national and concerns
those tenders with starting values above one million of euros and below the
community threshold (five million of SDR, special drawing rights16). These
tenders must be published on two national and two regional newspapers and
on the national official journal (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana,
GURI ). The average cost for publishing on a national newspaper is about
800 euros (somewhat less for a regional newspaper). GURI, though, is very
expensive: publishing a tender’s abstract may cost around 7-8 thousands of
euros. The degree of compliance is here as well rather low: 78%. Finally,
the maximum amount of publicity is enforced when tenders’ starting value is
above the community threshold. In that case the contracting authority must
also advertise on the Official Journal of the European Community (Gazzetta
16At the time of writing, 5,000,000 SDR were equivalent to 6,550,000 euros.
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Ufficiale Comunita` Europea, GUCE ) in addition to the obligations defined
for the tenders belonging to the previous group. Notice, however, that pub-
lishing on GUCE is free of charge, so no additional cost is sustained by the
contracting authorities. The degree of compliance is consistently rather high:
90%.
A major concern on the assignment of public tenders to publicity levels is
the possibility for authorities of splitting the starting value of the auction in
order to avoid the publication. Art. 24 of of Law 109/1994 prescribes that
a public authority must not split or vary a particular procurement need in
order to circumvent the monetary threshold requirements. In Sections (5.2)
and (7) we provide statistical evidence of no systematic sorting around the
thresholds.
Summarizing, in our sample: 92% of the tenders were published on the con-
tracting authority’s notice board, 25% on the Regional BUR and about 18%
on the GURI. On the other hand, the average number of newspapers on
which the advertisement of the tender appeared is: 0.24 for provincial news-
papers, 0.42 for regional newspapers and 0.61 for national newspapers. From
a more general perspective we can conclude that the sample show a suffi-
ciently large variation in the data leaving the possibility for the econometric
analysis which is illustrated in the following Section.
5 The Empirical Analysis
5.1 Identification strategy
Contracting authorities which maximize the auctioneer’s revenue implement
different advertisement strategies with respect to contracting authorities which
pursue other aims, such as maximize political rents through collusion with
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local firms. Authorities’ unobservable incentives determine a non random
assignment to publicity levels which causes endogeneity problem; we thus
expect Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the effects of publicity
on competition to be a wrong estimate of the true causal effect of public-
ity on competition, no matter how big the sample it is. To disentangle the
causality relationship between publicity and auction’s outcome discussed in
Figure (1), we implement a more refined technique: the Regression Discon-
tinuity Design (RDD). In Section (4) we saw that a higher level of publicity
(the treatment) is assigned to auctions if an observed covariate, the starting
value of the auction, crosses a known threshold. We are aware that using
exogenous thresholds which are identified by the law is not equivalent to
a controlled experiment because individuals’ assignment might be not com-
pletely random. Lee (2007), however, shows that in these cases the RDD can
nevertheless identify impact estimates that share the same validity as those
resulting from a randomized experiment.
In this Section we discuss the assumptions required to implement the RDD.
We define yj as the j-th threshold in the auctions’ starting value which de-
termines a discontinuity point in the support of the publicity function, as
established by the law. The j − th discontinuity point separates the j and
j + 1 levels in publicity assignment imposed to contractors. We call these
levels “publicity brackets”. We aim at identifying the causal effect of pub-
licity on auctions’ outcomes by focusing on auctions in the neighborhood of
those discontinuity points. Let Y be the auction’s real starting value (the
so called running variable), and Z be the level of theoretical publicity that
the contractor should implement under perfect compliance to the assignment
rule. We denote by P the level of publicity actually observed in the auction.
P may differ from its theoretical level if the contracting authority does not
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comply with the law assignment: indeed, it is very unlikely that a contracting
authority would be punished from AVLP if P differs from Z.17 Finally let
C represent the outcome of auctions. In the analysis we alternatively con-
sider C to be the number of bidders or the winning rebate. Let Cl and Ch
being the values of C respectively below and above the generic discontinuity
point j. To identify the causal effect of publicity on competition we need the
following continuity assumptions:
E{Cl|Y = y+j } = E{Cl|Y = y−j } (3)
E{Pl|Y = y+j } = E{Pl|Y = y−j } (4)
where y+j and y
−
j represent the left and the right limits of the starting
value of the auction. As in Hahn et al. (2001) and Garibaldi et al. (2007),
under the continuity conditions, for an auction in a neighborhood of the cut-
off point the mean effect of being assigned to a higher theoretical publicity
bracket Z = h (instead of the lower one Z = l) on the actual publicity level
P and on the competition level C are:
E{P |y+j } − E{P |y−j }. (5)
E{C|y+j } − E{C|y−j }. (6)
(5) and (6) are usually called the intention-to-treat (ITT) effects.18
Following Angrist et al. (2000) seminal paper we interpret the ratio of the
17Notice, by Law a violation of the publicity requirements invalidates the proceedings
of the public auction and the person in charge of the auction can be persecuted by both
the criminal and the administrative law for such violations. Nonetheless, to overcome the
non-perfect compliance problem of the contracting authorities to the publicity Law, we
use a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design.
18To keep the notation as simple as possible, we omit time subscripts. In the empirical
analysis we consider all the relations conditioned on time periods.
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two ITT effects of expressions (5) and (6) as the causal effect of P on C
(of publicity on competition). This can be done only if two more conditions
are satisfied: the validity of the exclusion restriction and the monotonicity
condition. The exclusion restriction requires that the theoretical publicity Z
affects the outcome, C, only through the observed level of publicity (which is
reasonable in our context, see Section (4) where the Institutional framework
is discussed). The monotonicity condition requires that no auction is induced
to display a lower (higher) actual level of publicity if the theoretical publicity
is exogenously moved from l to h (from h to l).
If the three assumptions are satisfied, then the ratio:
Π(yj) =
E{C|y+j } − E{C|y−j }
E{P |y+j } − E{P |y−j }
, (7)
identifies the average effect of a change in the actual level of publicity on the
level of competition at Y = yj for those who are induced to show a higher
level of publicity because their theoretical publicity increases from l to h.
We plot in Figure (3) non-parametric estimates of the main variables of
interest. The two boxes on the left plot P on Y at the discontinuity thresholds
1 and 2, respectively. The other two boxes on the right plot the number of
bidders on Y for the same discontinuity points. We estimate these locally
weighted smoothing regression separately on the left and on the right of the
cut-off points. Jumps in the plots show the effect of the threshold on the
variable of interest thus offering a graphical interpretation of the intention-
to-treat effects as defined by equations (5), and (6). As it can be noticed,
the figures show that the actual publicity is uniformly not lower than the
theoretical publicity on both discontinuities at the left of the threshold. At
the right of the threshold we observe some problems of compliance with
the law on publicity but not that big to violate the monotonicity condition
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required by RDD, as pointed out in Garibaldi et al. (2007). Concerning
the number of bidders, we observe a jump at the right of the first cut-off
point while a drop at the second. The mean impact of the actual publicity
on competition, which is the ratio of the jump of the level of competition
and the jump of the level of actual publicity, turns out to be positive at the
first discontinuity and negative but very small at the second. The figures
show that there is a substantial effect of publicity on competition at the first
threshold. This impact weakens at discontinuity 2 and 3 (not reported in the
figures).
To implement the RDD to our analysis we go through the following steps,
(see Imbens and Lemieux (2007)):
1. Inspect the Graphical Analysis,
2. Estimate the treatment effect using TSLS (IV-LATE) where standard
errors are computed using the usual (robust) TSLS standard errors,
3. Assess the identification assumptions by looking at possible jumps in
the value of pre-treatment variables at the cut-off point and implement
a formal test for the lack of continuity of the density function of the
running variable (i.e. auction’s starting value),
4. Assess the robustness of the results using alternative models and addi-
tional specifications.
5.2 Graphical Analysis
According to Table (3) publicity is a discontinuous function of the auction’s
starting value. We thus have:
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P =

P Geographical Level Running V ariable
0 Local if 1.5 ≤ Y < 5
1 Regional if 5 ≤ Y < 10
2 National if 10 ≤ Y < Y ∗
3 EU if Y ≥ Y ∗
Where Y is the starting value of the auction expressed in 100,000 euro (real
value year 2000) and Y ∗ varies across the year of analysis. Due to non perfect
compliance, we construct an indicator of theoretical publicity, which will be
used as the instrument for actual publicity:
Z =

0 if 1.5 ≤ Y < 5
1 if 5 ≤ Y < 10
2 if 10 ≤ Y < Y ∗
3 if Y ≥ Y ∗
Under perfect compliance Z and P should coincide. Figure (2) shows that
this is not the case in our context: the green line (which represents the ac-
tual publicity) indeed do not overlap with the orange line (which represents
the theoretical publicity). Because of this differences we consider a ”Fuzzy”
Regression Discontinuity Design.
To graphically inspect the validity of the continuity assumption we imple-
ment two graphical methods that are complementary. We follow Mc Crary
(2007), and Lee (2007) to support our identification strategy.
Figure (4) shows that the distribution of the auctions’ starting value is right
skewed. No significant mass probability around each of thresholds is iden-
tified, although a suspect of a peak is observed at discontinuity two. An
abnormal mass in the distribution of the starting value around each of the
thresholds may suggest a lack of continuity in the density function of the
running variable. We further investigate on this possibility considering the
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density based test a` la Mc Crary (2007).19 The inspection consists in two
steps. In the first step we obtain a very undersmoothed histogram of the
distribution of the starting value where the bins of the histogram are defined
carefully enough that no one histogram bin includes both points to the left
and right of the discontinuity point. In the second step we run a local linear
smoothing of the histogram where we treat the midpoints of the histogram
bins as a regressor, and the normalized counts of the number of observations
of the bins are considered as the outcome variable. Figure (5) suggests that
there are no jumps in the density estimates.
As discussed in Lee (2007) we further investigate this issue through the pre-
intervention variables. We define our set of pre-intervention variables from
the detailed information available to the researchers. These variables, in
principle, should meet the following two conditions: they should not be af-
fected by the publicity law, but they may depend on the same unobservables
(e.g. efficiency/collusion of the contractors with participants), likely to af-
fect the level of competition C. To test the continuity condition we use the
information available on the person in charge to take care of the auction’s
administrative process and on the administrative nature of the contracting
authority. In particular in figure (6) we plot and indicator of whether the
age of the person in charge is above the median distribution, and an indica-
tor of whether the contracting authority is the municipality against Y , the
starting values, and we analyze the behavior of the plots around the three
discontinuities thresholds. In the graphical analysis we present the plots on
these two pre-treatment variables around discontinuity 1 and 2. A charac-
teristic of these variables is they are observed before the determination of
19We comment this graphical inspection of the estimated density function at disconti-
nuity one only, see Figure (5). Results for the other discontinuities are available from the
authors.
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the publicity levels and before the auction takes place, thus they can be used
as pre-treatment variables. The graphical test for the continuity assumption
would suggest evidence of sorting and lack of continuity if the plots of these
indicators against Y would show a jump at the cut-off points. Identification
would not be possible in those cases since auctions assigned to high theo-
retical level of publicity Zh would be not comparable to auctions assigned
to a low level of publicity Zl with respect to unobservables relevant for the
outcome C. Figure (6) shows that there are no jumps at the first threshold
while jumps are very small at the second.
Thus the graphical analysis suggests the presence of no manipulation of the
running variable Y .
In addition to the graphical analysis, Table (4) reports descriptive statistics
of the auctions’ observable characteristics around discontinuity 1. In this ta-
ble we check whether the observable covariates are balanced to the right and
to the left of the first threshold. The rationale of this check is that around
discontinuities we should not observe any jump in the observable character-
istics with the exception of the outcome of the auctions and the publicity
level. Except for some differences in the required category (SOA3) we ob-
serve no systematic differences around discontinuity one. We further inspect
the institutional requirement for the SOA categories, and we exclude by the
study of the publicity law any systematic shift of the SOAs’ categories at
discontinuity one.20
In the following Section we further investigates these graphical results by
considering a battery of regression based tests.
20see Section (4).
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5.3 Regression Analysis: Discontinuities Effects
Van der Klaauw (2002), among others, discusses how to estimate the intention-
to-treat effects as defined by equations (5), and (6). In this paper we consider
a fully parametric model representation to evaluate the causal effects of pub-
licity on competition running several versions of the following equation:
Ci = α+ βPi + ²i (8)
When assignment to treatment is not random, endogeneity bias in the
estimation of β can rise because of a dependence between Pi and ²i. In this
case E[²/P ] 6= 0 and then any OLS estimate of equation (8) will deliver
inconsistent estimates of β. Using Regression Discontinuity design we have
additional information on the selection in to the treatment rule. To see
how the effect of publicity can be identified and estimated with RD design
we have to compare a sample of individuals within a very small interval
around the cutoff because they are essentially identical but they differ for the
level of publicity. Van der Klaauw (2002) clearly explain that increasing the
interval around the cutoff point is likely to induce a bias in the effect estimate,
especially if the assignment variable was itself related to the outcome variable
conditional on treatment status. In this paper, as suggested by Angrist and
Lavy (1999), Van der Klaauw (2002) and Garibaldi et al. (2007), we specify
and include the conditional mean function E[²/P, Y ] as a “control function”
in the outcome equation:
Ci = g(Yi) + βPi + δt + ωi (9)
where g(Yi) is a third order polynomial in Y , P the observed level of pub-
licity, δ is a year indicator, and ω = Ci − E[Ci/Pi, Yi]. Providing that we
23
can correctly specify g(Yi) we gain the property that E[ω/Y ] = 0 and thus
equation (9) can be correctly estimated via OLS because P will be free from
correlation with the disturbances.
As discussed in section (4) the assignment to treatment is known to depend
partially on the running variable Y and partially on other unobservable phe-
nomena (e.g. local collusion, perverse incentives, or simply measurement
error) that can potentially be correlated with the unobservable components
of the outcome equation. This second type of Regression Discontinuity de-
sign is referred to the literature as “fuzzy”. As in Angrist and Lavy (1999),
Van der Klaauw (2002) and Garibaldi et al. (2007) we propose a fully para-
metric approach and we assume that the assignment to treatment status can
be summarized by the following equation:
Pi = g(Yi) + γZi + δt + νi (10)
We estimate the causal effect of publicity on competition via Two Stages
Least Squares (TSLS, or IV-LATE) with Z = 1{Yi ≥ Y } as excluded instru-
ments and the polynomial g(Yi) as included one.
In reporting the estimation results of equation (9) we comment the estimates
at each of the three discontinuity thresholds generated by the publicity law.
Table (5) reports the estimated coefficients, β̂, of the effects of publicity on
auctions’ outcomes of Equation (9). In the two Panels A, and B, of Table
(5), we report the sample averages of the outcomes of interest (the number
of bidders and the winning rebate), the intention-to-treat, the OLS and the
IV-LATE estimates with the (robust) standard errors for the coefficients of
publicity only. The odd rows, starting from the third report the estimated
coefficients considering separately the three different discontinuities in the
publicity function.
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Column 1 of Table (5) reports the intention-to-treat effect of theoretical
publicity (e.g. the excluded instrument) on actual (e.g. the observed level)
publicity.21 The estimates indicate that an increase from a lower starting
value bracket, say 1.5 − 5 hundreds of thousand of euros, to an higher one,
say 5 − 10 hundreds of thousand of euros, shifts the actual publicity by 0.2
with a standard error of 0.02 ( by the 0.36 with a standard error of 0.07 if
we consider the second income bracket, and by 0.65 with a standard error
of 0.21 if we consider the third income bracket). These results clearly iden-
tify a lack of full treatment compliance due to non perfect law enforcement.
We believe that this problem is not such big to invalidate the monotonicity
assumption required by the RDD, see Garibaldi et al. (2007). Column 2 of
Table (5) reports the intention-to-treat effect of theoretical publicity on the
number of bidders and the winning rebate (Panel A, and B). The estimates
obtained separately for each discontinuity point are not statistically different
from zero. The OLS estimates of the number of bidders and the winning
rebate on the actual level of publicity suggest different results: they show
a negative and statistically significant correlation between publicity and the
number of bidders at discontinuity 2 and a negative and statistically signifi-
cant correlation between publicity and the winning rebate at discontinuity 1
and 2.
Column 4 of Table (5) reports the Instrumental Variables Local Average
Treatment Effects (henceforth, IV-LATE) estimates (and robust standard
errors below) at each discontinuity. The estimates around discontinuity 1,
21This is the estimated coefficient of the instrument on the endogenous regressor. For
all the estimates the ratio between the estimated coefficient and the standard error is
the t-statistics which happen to be always greater than two. In this model we have one
instrument and thus the first stage F-statistics are just the square of the t-statistics. The
first-stage F are always greater than 10 (not reported, but available on request) suggesting
that the IV-LATE estimates are not affected by the weak instruments problem.
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indicate that an increase in tenders’ publicity, from local to regional levels,
determines an average increase of 19 in the number of bidders with respect
to a sample average of 38, and an average increase in the winning rebate of
4.9 with respect to a sample average of 16 %. Both effects are statistically
different from zero at 5 % significance level. As anticipated in the Intro-
duction, this result suggests that increasing the publicity level from local to
regional can yield considerable benefits for the contracting authority, such as
an average saving of 25,000 euros for an auction with average starting value
of 516,000 euros. The empirical analysis support the validity of the law. In
other words, the “knowledge effect” of letting more firms know about the
existence of the auction here dominates the “deterrence effect” of a fiercer
competition to be faced while bidding. This result is especially meaning-
ful if we consider that, at least in Italy, the cost of publishing at regional
level is very low. The estimates around discontinuity 2, indicate that, rather
surprisingly, an increase in tenders’ publicity, from regional to nation levels,
determines a decrease of 21 in the number of bidders with respect to a sample
average of 38, and an average increase in the winning rebate by 3 with re-
spect to a sample average of 16 %. However, both effects are not statistically
significant at 5 %. It appears, thus, that shifting the publicity level from
regional to national, at the very last does not attract other potential bidders
to the auction. This rather striking result suggests that the regional level
of publicity is already sufficient to let potential national bidders be aware of
the existence of the auction. Hence, any additional advertisement at national
level would yield only additional costs and no additional benefits. Finally,
the estimates around discontinuity 3 indicate that an increase in tenders’
publicity, from national to European levels, determines an average decrease
of 6.4 in the number of bidders with respect to a sample average of 38, and
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an average increase in the winning rebate of 10 with respect to a sample av-
erage of 16 %. The former effect is not statistically significant at 5 %, while
the latter is statistically different from zero at 5 % significance level. This
last result appears to be coherent with the previous ones nd it suggests an
additional interesting consideration: increasing publicity to European level
does not increase the number of bidders, but it probably affects the quality of
them. When an auction causes a great stir at European level, most efficient
firms likely move into play, keeping constant the number of participating
firms (because the least efficient firms, knowing that they cannot compete,
do not even apply) but increasing the auctioneer’s rent by increasing the
winning rebate. This explanation is of major interest and should be tested
with further empirical investigation. We plan to address this issue when new
additional data will be available.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
One concern with our model so far it is that the apparently discontinuous
relationship between the level of competition and the publicity levels may
be due to the model specification, to sample selection, or to the omission
of the relevant characteristics of public procurement auctions. In Section
(3) the baseline model includes the third order polynomial in the starting
value and the year effects only. This specification may not be sufficiently
flexible to absorb all the auctions characteristics. To assess this possibility, in
Table (7) we present estimation results for 5 alternative specifications but we
comment the results for the winning rebate, only.22 In column 1 we reduce the
discontinuity sample by more than 50 %.23 The reduced discontinuity sample
22Results on the number of bidders are available on request.
23Given the inclusion of the polynomial in the starting value, the control function, we
did not perform a cross-validation selection procedure of both the original discontinuity
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includes auctions with starting vale between 4 and 6 hundred thousand euros
instead of 3.5 and 7.99 hundred thousand euros at discontinuity 1, auctions
with starting vale between 9 and 11 hundred thousand euros instead of 8 and
13 hundred thousand euros at discontinuity 2, and auctions with starting vale
between 55 and 75 hundred thousand euros instead of 20 and 111 hundred
thousand euros at discontinuity 3. In column 2 we add the fourth order
power of the starting value. In column 3 we add the fourth order power
of the starting value and reduce the discontinuity sample. In column 4 we
add the LARGE information set. The LARGE information set contains the
following list of observable characteristics:
• Works’ characteristics: wether the works are for roads, education, cul-
ture, or other
• Auctions’ characteristics: the technical requirement to participate (OG,
and RSOA characteristics)
• Auctioneers’ characteristics: whether the contracting authority is the
municipality or the province.
Finally, in column 5 we add the fourth order polynomial in the starting value
and the LARGE information set.
In Table (7) the odd row reports the OLS estimates while the even rows
report the across-models IV-LATE effects of publicity on the winning rebate
at each discontinuity thresholds. We comment the IV-LATE effects only.
In column 1, the reduced sample in the neighborhood of discontinuity 1 is
sample and the reduced sample in order to select the sample windows around the three
discontinuities. As expected we do not observe a remarkable change in the results consid-
ering different selections of the sample although we reduced the sample by more than 50
%.
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of 5983 auctions instead of the original discontinuity 1 sample of 11434 auc-
tions. The reduced sample estimates of the effect of an increase in publicity
from local to regional on the winning rebate is of 6.2 percentage points with
standard error 4.4 compared to 4.9 percentage points with standard error
2.1 of the baseline effect. The point estimates appear to be not remarkably
different but as expected estimated with less precision. We observe the same
pattern at discontinuities 2 and 3. Once we augment the model specification
with the fourth order polynomial in the starting value, column 2, we esti-
mate the effect of publicity on the winning rebate to be respectively 6.7 (with
standard error 2.7), 2.5 (with standard error 2), and 9.9 (with standard error
4.7) at the three discontinuities. The augmented model results appear to be
pretty similar to the baseline estimates that are 4.9 (with standard error 2.1),
3 (with standard error 2.1), and 10 (with standard error 3.8) at the three
discontinuities. In column 3 we both reduce the sample size by 50 % and
add the fourth order polynomial in the starting value. The estimation results
are similar to the baseline effects of publicity on the winning rebate only at
discontinuity one where the sample size is larger. Although the effect of an
increase in publicity from local to regional is of 5.6 it has a standard error
of 4.6 suggesting that it is not statistically different from zero. Estimation
results in column 3 are not statistically different from zero at any of the three
discontinuities. In columns 4-5 firstly we add at the baseline specification the
set of regressors included in the LARGE information set; secondly we add the
fourth order polynomial in the starting value. Once we augment the model
specification with the LARGE information set, column 4, we estimate the
effect of publicity on the winning rebate to be respectively 4 (with standard
error 2.1), 2.8 (with standard error 2.1), and 13 (with standard error 6.7)
at the three discontinuities. Once we augment the model specification with
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the LARGE information set and the fourth order polynomial in the starting
value, column 5, we estimate the effect of publicity on the winning rebate to
be respectively 5.5 (with standard error 2.7), 2.2 (with standard error 2.1),
and 12 (with standard error 6.8) at the three discontinuities. The estimation
results of the augmented models reported in columns 4-5, are very similar to
the baseline estimates that are 4.9 (with standard error 2.1), 3 (with stan-
dard error 2.1), and 10 (with standard error 3.8) at the three discontinuities.
Hence, sensitivity analysis results appear to be robust to sample selection,
functional form restrictions, and the inclusion of the characteristics of the
goods and the auctions.
6 Benefits from Competition: Duration Anal-
ysis
In this Section we ask whether an increase in competition in auction may
lead to the selection of more efficient winners and, thus, to a reduction in the
time needed to accomplish the works, provided that the works are satisfying
tenders’ technical requirements. We consider the time to accomplish the
works provided that the works are satisfying tenders’ technical requirements.
We report evidence of a negative correlation between proxies of competition
and the time to accomplish the works. In particular we describe the behavior
of the hazard function, h(l) = f(s)
S(s)
, defined as the (instantaneous) probability
of accomplishing the works at s given survival until s.24 We use duration
analysis models because our data are right-censored: indeed, several works
24Let L ≥ 0 be the random variable representing the duration of the works (expressed
as the number of days between the moment in which the auction takes place and the
accomplishment of the works) and l the realized duration. F (l) = Pr[L ≤ l] is the
cumulative distribution function, while S(l) = Pr[L > l] = 1 − F (l) is the survival
function.
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are still not accomplished at the day the data were collected. Hence, for each
i the observed duration Ti = t is the minimum among the complete duration
Li = l and the censored duration Ci = c. We first report non parametric
hazard estimates and then we add some structure to the hazard function
in order to link its behavior to auctions’ indicators of competition. In the
non parametric analysis we let di(t) be the number of works accomplished at
duration t and ri(t) be the number of works at risk of being accomplished at
time t with duration t (where ri(t) includes the works censored at t or later).
The estimated hazard function is
hˆi(t) =
di(t)
ri(t)
(11)
and the, the Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function is
Sˆi(t) =
∏
s≤t
(
1− di(s)
ri(s)
)
(12)
Figure (7) plots the Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimates of the survival function of
the duration of the works, by the number of bidders for road constructions.
From left to right, the orange line represents the KM estimates considering
all the auctions where the number of bidders are above the median of the
sample distribution of the number of bidders. The green line pools together
all the observations while the blue line represents auctions with the number
of bidders below the median. According to Figure (7) the survival functions
are parallel, and always higher for auctions with number of bidders below the
median, which implies that they have a higher overall duration rate. Given
the properties of the non parametric KM survival function we add structure
to the duration analysis and we implement a battery of parametric models
to formally test the statistical significance of this finding. In the parametric
models we pool together all the available information and control for it by
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considering two set of information: MEDIUM and LARGE.25 We base our
analysis on the partial-likelihood approach proposed by Cox (1972).26 We
report the estimates of the βˆ of a series of models as follow:
hi(t|x, β) = h0(t)eX′β (13)
where h0 is the baseline hazard probability. Table (8) reports the results
of the analysis on works’ duration. Columns 1 and 2 show the correlations
between a shift of the number of bidders and of the winning rebate above the
median of their sample distribution, respectively, with the hazard probability.
The estimated coefficients are reported in the form of βˆ (and not as hazard
ratios) with the robust standard errors in parentheses. For instance, the first
row βˆ = 0.17 indicates that a shift of the number of bidders above the median
determines an increase in the hazard relative to the baseline hazard of 17%
(and hence a significative reduction in the duration of the works). This effect
is significant at 1% level. A positive and significant effect is also observed for
the winning rebate. Evidence thus suggests a negative correlation between
the number of bidders and the winning rebate and the duration of the works.
The estimates thus report some preliminary evidence of the theoretical pre-
dictions by Compte et al. (2002) suggesting that an increase the level of
competition is correlated to the efficiency of public good procurement.
25Those characteristics are discussed in the previous section.
26We report the COX-PH model only. Results for Exponential, Weibull, and Gom-
pertz are available on request. Notice that this class of models requires the propor-
tionality assumption to write the hazard function as in equation (11). As suggested in
Jenkins’ class notes (http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/teaching/degree/stephenj/ec968/), we
inspect the shape of the survival function and we observe a parallelism among them. We
thus considered feasible the implementation of the proportional hazard class of models.
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7 Conclusions
Economic theory suggests that increasing the actual number of bidders in
an auction has a positive effect on the auctioneer’s rent, Klemperer (2002).
Increasing the number of potential bidders via an increase in the level of pub-
licity made to advertise the tender has an ambiguous effect on the auction’s
outcome, though. On the one hand, a firm may not be aware that a tender is
taking place if the contracting authority does not advertise it. On the other
hand, a firm might be discouraged from participating if it observes a high
level of publicity because this signals that competition in the auction will be
fierce: if the probability of recouping the participation cost is too low, the
firm might decide not to enter the competition.
In the paper we first adapt the model of Menezes and Monteiro (2000) on
endogenous entry into auctions allowing for the optimal choice of publicity
and show that it can be the case that the optimal level of publicity is not
the maximal one, even if publicity comes for free to the auctioneer. That
is: it might be the case that keeping the number of potential bidders smaller
than what it could be is an optimal policy, because of the trade-off illustrated
above. Next, we apply our econometric analysis to the database collected by
the Italian Authority for Surveillance of Public Procurement and using the
RDD method we disentangle the causal effect of publicity on the number of
bidders and on the winning rebate. Our empirical analysis reports evidence
of a positive and statistically significant effect of publicity on the number of
bidders and on the winning rebate when the level of publicity is increased
from local to regional level (+50 % and +31 % respectively). This result
suggests that increasing the publicity level from local to regional can yield
considerable benefits for the contracting authority, especially if we consider
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that the cost of publishing at regional level is rather low in Italy. On the other
hand, no statistically significant effect is observed when publicity is increased
from regional to national level. It appears, thus, that this increased level of
publicity is not useful in attracting other potential bidders to the auction.
A possible conclusion that can be drawn from this result is that regional ad-
vertisement is already per se sufficient to inform national dimensioned firms,
and publishing at national level most likely causes an additional (rather high)
cost to the contracting authority without yielding any additional benefit. Fi-
nally, publicity is found to have a strong effect on the winning rebate but
not on the number of bidders when it is increased from national to European
level: +62 %. We can interpret this result as a signal that publicity at Eu-
ropean wide level has an impact on the final outcome of the auction which
is determined not by the quantity of the participating bidders but, likely, by
the quality of the firms which are participating the auction. Publishing on
the Official Journal of the European Community might then be a way for
the contracting authority to select efficient European firms and ultimately
increase its rent.
The results described above are supported by the tests of the continuity con-
ditions which we perform both graphically and within the regression analysis’
framework.
We also report evidence of a negative correlation between competition and
the time to deliver the public good within a duration analysis framework.
Indeed, a shift of the number of bidders above the median determines an
increase in the hazard of 12% and a shift of the winning rebate above the
median determines an increase in the hazard rate by 10%. These effects are
all significant at the 1% level. The empirical analysis thus suggests that,
within the context of our data, increasing the level of publicity has a positive
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effect on public procurement outcomes. At this level of the analysis, however,
we cannot disentangle the positive effect which is due just to the number of
potential competitors from several other effects which publicity might have
on the nature of competition. Indeed, increasing the publicity level might
determine a reduction in the probability of collusion (simply because a ’mav-
erick entry’ from outside becomes more likely) or it might attract a particular
kind of competitor which might induce local firms to bid more aggressively.
We plan to address that issue in further research.
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Appendix A: Testing for the presence of Sort-
ing and Lack of Continuity Conditions
As discussed in Section (5.1), the RDD identification strategy is mainly based
on the validity of the continuity conditions, equations (3) and (4). In this ap-
plication of the RDD we have in mind the caveat that auctions’ starting value
is not exogenously determined and that the publicity thresholds are public
knowledge. Strategic contracting authorities may set auctions’ starting value
just below the publicity thresholds. That is, pro-local authorities that do not
care of maximizing auctions’ revenues may have incentives to strategically
reduce the starting value below the discontinuity thresholds in order not to
publish the tenders and favor local entrepreneurs. Although we have already
discussed that this strategic splitting of the starting value is forbidden by the
Law on public procurement and we report graphical evidence of no sorting,
we formally test the possibility of such violations. We focus the statistical
analysis following McCrary (2007), and Lee (2007). Since the two methods
are complementary we comment the results based on the pre-treatment vari-
ables only.27 We estimate the same models as in equation (9) but use as
outcomes a set of pre-treatment variables. We extend the graphical analysis
of Section (5.2), increasing the available information on the person in charge
for the auction’s administrative process (age and gender) and on the admin-
istrative nature of the contracting authority (Province and Municipality). In
Panel A of Table (6) the first pre-treatment outcome that we consider is an
indicator of whether the person in charge is above the median distribution of
age (52 years old). If the estimates of the coefficients on the actual publicity
indicator using the theoretical publicity as an instrument are statistically dif-
27The McCray (2007) density tests confirm the analysis on the pre-treatment variables
and are not reported but available on request.
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ferent from zero, that would indicate that there are systematic differences in
the age of the profession of the person in charge before and after the thresh-
olds. This would suggest the possibility that in some of the auctions there
was selection around the thresholds and lack of continuity in the baseline
outcomes. The second indicator is whether the person is the gender of the
person in charge. In Panel B of Table (6) the first pre-treatment outcome
that we consider is an indicator of whether the contracting authority is the
Province and the second of whether it is the municipality. In both Panel A
and B we report estimates for the entire sample and for the discontinuity 1
sample. Estimation results reports evidence of no selection around the dis-
continuities. The intention-to-treat estimates in the first column indicates
that a one unit increase in the publicity level is associated with a reduction
of 0.0046 of the indicator of the median age of the person in charge. This
estimate is small and statistically not different from zero. We find significant
effects for the IV-LATE estimates in the fifth and sixth columns of the ta-
ble when we consider the MEDIUM and the LARGE information set. The
MEDIUM information set is the same as for the regression for Table (5) and
includes a third order polynomial in the starting value and time indicators.
The LARGE information set includes the MEDIUM and indicators on the
nature of the good (roads, culture, education) the administrative nature of
the contracting authority ( Municipality or Province), technical and financial
characteristics required by the contracting authority to the bidders (RSOA,
and OG, see section (4)). We further enquire this issue by using other in-
formation on the person in charge such as the gender.28 As in the first row
of Table (6), also in the other rows each coefficient comes from a separate
regression. For example, the left cell of the row corresponding to the gender
28We obtained this information from the fiscal code.
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of the person in charge indicates that an increase in the amount of publicity
increases the probability of being male of the person in charge by 0.002 and
this estimate is small and statistically not different from zero. The coefficient
get smaller if we consider the same regression at discontinuity 1. This is ex-
actly what we should find if our identification strategy is correct and such
conclusion is confirmed by the rest of the table. Moreover, all the estimates
in Panel B indicate no systematic differences with respect to the indicators
of whether the contracting authority is the Province or the Municipality.
Estimation results allow us to exclude the existence of sorting around the
thresholds.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Percentiles
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 n
Number of Bidding Firms 32 35 3 9 21 44 77 41510
Winning Rebate 16 8.9 4.7 10 15 21 29 41510
Notice Board .92 .27 1 1 1 1 1 41510
Regional Official Journal .25 .43 0 0 0 1 1 41510
Italian Official Journal .18 .39 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Number of Province Newspapers .24 .72 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Number of Regional Newspapers .42 .81 0 0 0 0 2 41510
Number of National Newspapers .61 .92 0 0 0 1 2 41510
Starting Value (in 100000 Euro) 7.2 12 1.8 2.2 3.6 7 15 41510
Technical Requirements: Buildings .13 .34 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Required Category at least 3 .29 .45 0 0 0 1 1 41510
The contractor is a Municipality .52 .5 0 0 1 1 1 41510
The contractor is a Province .12 .33 0 0 0 0 1 41510
The contractor is in the North .45 .5 0 0 0 1 1 41510
The contractor is in the Center .25 .43 0 0 0 0 1 41510
The contractor is in the South .22 .42 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000
and 2005. 43
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, by Typology of
the Object
Typology Roads Education Culture Others
Number of Bidding Firms 46 23.5 20.4 28.1
Winning Rebate 16.6 15.3 14.1 16.2
Notice Board .935 .953 .948 .9
Regional Official Journal .229 .261 .274 .261
Italian Official Journal .144 .161 .181 .204
Number of Province Newspapers .252 .228 .236 .234
Number of Regional Newspapers .407 .341 .422 .432
Number of National Newspapers .545 .635 .604 .633
Starting Value (in 100000 euro) 6.33 6.95 7.5 7.47
Technical Requirements: Buildings .0146 .271 .204 .164
Required Category at least 3 .271 .269 .302 .294
The contractor is a Municipality .5 .608 .774 .459
The contractor is a Province .208 .269 .0445 .0542
The contractor is in the North .437 .499 .461 .432
The contractor is in the Center .237 .246 .327 .242
The contractor is in the South .243 .191 .169 .235
Fraction of the total 30.6 10.9 7.09 43.1
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000
and 2005.
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Table 3: Advertisement: Rules and Costs
Starting Value Theoretical Costs Non-Compliance
y Publicity of publishing to the Law
(in 100000 euro) (in euro) (%)
EU-Official Journal (GUCE) Free
Italian Official Journal (GURI) 7000-8000
y ≥ 65.5 National Newspapers (at least 2) 800 10
Regional Newspapers (at least 2) 600
Italian Official Journal (GURI) 7000-8000
10 ≤ y < 65.5 National Newspapers (at least 2) 800 22.5
Regional Newspapers (at least 2) 600
Regional Official Journal (BUR) 200-500
5 ≤ y < 10 Provincial Newspapers (at least 2) 400 28.9
y < 5 Notice Board Free 6.5
Note: In the table y represent the starting value of the auction. To compute the
third threshold we considered 65.5 as the value of 5,000,000 of SDR in EURO 2000.
The cost average of regional official journals, and of the regional, and provincial
newspapers are regional and provincial averages.
Source: Law 109/1994 and Authors’ interviews with national advertisement com-
panies.
Figure 2: The Publicity Function
Local
Regional
National
EU
0
1
2
3
Pu
bl
ici
ty
1.5 5 10 65.5
Euro (in 100000)
Actual Publicity Theoretical Publicity
Source: Theoretical publicity and actual publicity (aggregate average) for all the
public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Characteris-
tics of the Object Around Discontinuity
One
Panel A:
Characteristics Roads Education Culture Municipality Province
Before Disc.1 0.31 0.11 0.07 0.53 0.11
(sd) 0.46 0.31 0.26 0.50 0.31
After Disc.1 0.30 0.11 0.08 0.50 0.12
(sd) 0.46 0.31 0.27 0.50 0.33
Total 0.30 0.11 0.07 0.52 0.12
(sd) 0.46 0.31 0.26 0.50 0.32
Panel B:
Characteristics North Centre South Tec.Req.: Req. Cat.
Buildings at least 3
Before Disc.1 0.45 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.05
(sd) 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.34 0.22
After Disc.1 0.47 0.24 0.21 0.13 0.51
(sd) 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.50
Total 0.46 0.24 0.22 0.13 0.26
(sd) 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.34 0.44
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between
2000-2005.
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Table 5: Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Publicity
on Competition
Method OLS-ITT OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE N. of Obs.
Dep.Var Publicity Auction’s Auction’s Auction’s
outcome outcome outcome
Treatment Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Publicity Publicity
Instrument Theo.Publ.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Number of Bidders
Mean-Outcome . . 38 . . 17336
(sd) . . 35 . . .
Discontinuity 1 .2 3.1 . .93 19 11434
(se) .019 1.6 . .96 8.5 .
Discontinuity 2 .36 -4.6 . -3.5 -21 3528
(se) .069 3.7 . .9 11 .
Discontinuity 3 .65 -4.6 . .56 -6.4 2374
(se) .21 4 . .67 7.1 .
Panel B: Winning Rebate
Mean-Outcome . . 16 . . 17336
(sd) . . 8.7 . . .
Discontinuity 1 .2 .82 . -1 4.9 11434
(se) .019 .39 . .22 2.1 .
Discontinuity 2 .36 .81 . -1.1 3 3528
(se) .069 .65 . .17 2.1 .
Discontinuity 3 .65 6.1 . -.16 10 2374
(se) .21 1.6 . .18 3.8 .
Note: Each coefficient (and standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β
obtained from the regressions of the form:
Ci = g(yi) + βPi + δt + ωi
where C is the actual level of publicity in column 1 and: the number of bidders
in Panel A, and the winning rebate in Panel B; P is the theoretical publicity in
columns 1 and 2, and the observed publicity in columns 3 and 4. g(yi) is the third
order polynomial in the starting value. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report OLS estimates:
column 4 IV using the theoretical publicity as instrument for observed publicity.
δt are year indicators.
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000
and 2005.
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Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis: Discontinuity Effects of
Publicity on the Winning Rebate
Model Reduced 4th Order Reduced LARGE LARGE
sample polynomial sample + Info-Set Info-Set +
4th Order 4th Order
polynomial polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity 1
OLS -.42 -1.1 -.43 -1.2 -1.2
(se) .3 .22 .3 .22 .22
IV 6.2 6.7 5.6 4 5.5
(se) 4.4 2.7 4.6 2.1 2.7
N 5983 11434 5983 11434 11434
Panel B: Discontinuity 2
OLS -1.3 -1.1 -1.3 -1 -1
(se) .28 .17 .28 .17 .17
IV 6.9 2.5 8 2.8 2.2
(se) 4.1 2 4.6 2.1 2.1
N 1495 3528 1495 3528 3528
Panel C: Discontinuity 3
OLS 1.8 -.18 1.6 -.093 -.1
(se) .65 .18 .65 .18 .18
IV 12 9.9 20 13 12
(se) 16 4.7 50 6.7 6.8
N 209 2374 209 2374 2374
Note: Each coefficient (and robust standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β
obtained from the regressions of the form:
Ri = g(Yi) + βPi + γXi + δt + ωi
where R is the winning rebate and P is the actual level of publicity, Xi a vector of
observable characteristics and g(yi) is the polynomial in the starting value. Odd rows
report OLS while even rows IV-LATE estimates using the theoretical publicity as
instrument for observed publicity. δt are year indicators. In columns 4-5 the LARGE
info-set includes indicators on the nature of the good (roads, culture, education) the
administrative nature of the contracting authority (Municipality or Province), technical
and financial characteristics required by the contracting authority to the bidders (RSOA,
and OG). Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.
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